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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Prosperity and depression are relative concepts. Today both France and Japan are de-
pressed relative to the United States; equivalently, the United States is prosperous relative to
these countries. I say these countries are depressed relative to the United States because their
output per working-age person is 30 percent less than the U.S. level. An interesting and impor-
tant policy question is, Why are these countries depressed? The answers for these two countries
turn out to be very different.
The United States is prosperous relative to France because the U.S. intratemporal tax
wedge that distorts the tradeoff between consumption and leisure is much smaller than the
French wedge. I will show that if France modified its intratemporal tax wedge so that its value
was the same as the U.S. value, French welfare in consumption equivalents would increase by 19
percent. Consumption would have to increase by 19 percent now and in all future periods to
achieve as large a welfare gain as that resulting from this tax reform.
The United States is prosperous relative to Japan because production efficiency is higher
in the United States. In the United States, total factor productivity is approximately 20 percent
higher than in Japan. If Japan suddenly became as efficient in production as the United States, its
welfare gain in consumption equivalents would be 39 percent.
Equally interesting and important are big changes over time in relative output (per work-
ing-age person) across countries. Why are New Zealand’s and Switzerland’s economies de-
pressed by over 30 percent relative to their 1970 trend-corrected levels? Both of these countries
have small populations, but depressions are not restricted to small countries. Japan, with its 125
million people, is now depressed by 20 percent relative to its 1991 trend-corrected level. On the
prosperity side, why are Ireland and South Korea so prosperous now relative to their 1970 trend-
corrected levels?2
This lecture is concerned primarily with big international differences among relatively
rich industrial countries and changes in these differences over time. The countries that receive
primary attention all have market economies and healthy, well-educated populations.
In the countries considered, the variations in aggregate output per working-age person are
large, and reasonably good measures of the factor inputs are available. This permits, in many
cases, the identification of the change in policy or the difference in policy that gave rise to pros-
perity or depression. This is in contrast to business cycle theory, which provides little guidance
to policy except for the important policy implication that a stabilization effort will have either no
effect or a perverse effect. The output variations studied and analyzed in this lecture are big: an
order of magnitude larger than the much-studied business cycle fluctuations. The variations
studied, however, are an order of magnitude smaller than the much-studied differences between
the richest and poorest countries.
Surprisingly, only recently have depressions been systematically studied from the per-
spective of growth theory, which is the theory used to study not only secular growth but also
business cycle fluctuations. Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian (1999) break the taboo against
studying depressions from this perspective. The January 2002 issue of The Review of Economic
Dynamics, edited by Timothy J. Kehoe and Edward C. Prescott (2002), examines a number of
the great depressions of the twentieth century from the perspective of growth theory. This lecture
draws heavily on these studies.
In the above discussion, the intertemporal comparisons have no meaning until trend
growth is defined. Trend growth is the result of growth in the stock of world knowledge that can
be accessed at modest cost and that enhances production possibilities. Trend growth is important
for understanding why countries are so much richer today on average than they were 50 or 1003
years ago. It is not important for understanding relative levels across countries and changes in
relative levels across countries over time, which are the topics of this lecture.
What rates should be used to measure trend growth? I assume that the stock of world
knowledge useful in production grows smoothly over time. In this lecture, I will use a 2 percent
constant annual growth rate throughout the twentieth century. This is the average growth rate of
output per working-age person in the United State in the twentieth century. Figure 1 shows that
the only large deviations of U.S. output per working-age person in the twentieth century from a 2
percent trend occur during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the World War II output boom.
I see the use of a 2 percent trend growth rate as a much better procedure than ignoring it com-
pletely in the tradition of NBER business cycle analyses.
Figure. 1: U.S. GDP per Person Aged 15-64
Again, why are New Zealand and Switzerland now depressed by 30 percent relative to
their 1970 trend-corrected levels, a fact depicted in Figure 2? Mexico is the only other member
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) that is depressed to a
significant extent relative to its 1970 trend level. Japan is currently depressed relative to its 1991







































level, but not relative to its 1970 level. Ireland and Korea are the two OECD members that cur-
rently are significantly more prosperous relative to their trend-corrected 1970 levels. Ireland is
now 60 percent above its 1970 level, and Korea is 160 percent above its 1970 level.
Figure 2: Two Contemporary Depressions
Table 1 shows that Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands prospered in the
postwar period relative to their prewar trends. Why did these countries all increase their trend-
corrected productivity levels by 80 percent relative to their pre-World War II levels? I think that
these original European Union countries are prosperous relative to their prewar trend-corrected
levels because an economic policy change resulted in productivity increasing to 180 percent of
its pre-World War II trend level. In this lecture, I will discuss what I see as the key change in





































Source: Angus Maddison (1995, Table J-5; p. 245).
The EU countries are Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, and Netherlands.
The theoretical framework used in this lecture is the growth model. The key elements of
the theory are the aggregate production function of the stand-in firm and the utility function of
the stand-in household. The technology side specifies people’s ability to substitute, whereas the
preference side describes people’s willingness to substitute. With price-taking behavior, the abil-
ity and willingness to substitute are equated.
In this lecture, I will devote particular attention to Japan, an interesting country from the
perspective of the growth theory given its growth miracle in the 1955-72 period and its current
depressed state. Fumio Hayashi and Prescott (2002) have recently studied Japan to understand
why its economy is now depressed nearly 20 percent relative to its level 10 years ago. The Japa-
nese people probably want to know what set of policy reforms will lead to prosperity.6
I. The Importance of National Income and Product Accounts
The connection between Richard T. Ely and this lecture is through students of his students.
Wesley Mitchell may well be Ely’s greatest student. Mitchell, in turn, had at least two truly great
students. One was Irving Fisher, who was one of the earliest to recognize that the principles ap-
plicable to static economic analyses are equally applicable to dynamic economic analyses once
goods are indexed by date. This is the dynamic economic theory used in this lecture. Another of
Mitchell’s great students was Simon S. Kuznets, whose statistical work measuring the perform-
ance of national economies is the genesis of the growth model. Kuznets (1926, 1937, 1941)
measured gross national product and its investment and consumption subcomponents. He and his
students measured categories of claims against this product.
1 Kuznets came up with a measure of
aggregate capital inputs. Others, in particular, his student John H. Kendrick (1956), came up with
measures of the labor input and estimates of productivity.
The best accounting system from the perspective of growth theory, however, is the origi-
nal modern U.S. national income and product accounts system, the conceptual basis of which is
important due to George Jaszi (Richard Ruggles, 1983, p. 23). This system is used by Hayashi
and Prescott (2002) in their study of the Japanese economy in the 1990s and in this lecture for
the 1960-90 period. Gross national product, rather than gross domestic product, is used because
GNP is the income of households in the growth model. If a single-sector model is used, growth
theory dictates the use of GNP rather than GDP, with net exports and net foreign factor income
as part of investment. With the original modern U.S. system, for example, earning on a foreign
investment is treated as an export of capital services. With these accounting conventions, saving
equals investment and output is the sum of private consumption expenditure, government pur-
chases of goods and services, and investment.7
Inputs and outputs to the market sector measure the performance of the market sector. The
performance of the market sector in turn measures the performance of economic policy. Bad per-
formance of the market sector is the result of bad economic policies, where policy is broadly de-
fined to include the regulatory and legal environment as well as tax policies.
U.S. economists are not the only important contributors to the development of the national
income and product accounts. British economists developed a good system of national accounts,
which is the basis for the UN system used throughout most of the world today. For the concep-
tual ideas underlying the development of the UN system, Richard Stone (1986) gives credit to
Colin Clark (1937). Stone, D. G. Champernowne, and J. E. Meade (1942), however, formalize
Clark’s ideas and put them into a consistent accounting framework.
II. The Growth Model and an Accounting Framework
The national income and product account statistics display certain regularities: the relative
constancy of factor income shares, the investment-consumption shares, the fraction of productive
time allocated to the market, and the capital/output ratio. These observations along with the
secular growth in output per working-age person led to the growth model.
Real business cycle theorists are interested in business cycle fluctuations, and they extended
the growth model in two respects: They introduced uncertainty and they made the labor-leisure
decision endogenous. They, and I think others in the profession, were surprised to find that the
growth model extended in this way displayed the business cycle facts given the behavior of real
shocks, that is, the behavior of factors determining the steady state of the deterministic growth
model. This was a great success for growth theory, which was designed to account for the growth
facts. In this lecture, I use this theory to study periods of prosperity and depression. I use the
same model as the one used by the real business cycle theorists except that my model has no un-8
certainty. I focus on relative levels and equilibrium paths, rather than statistical properties of the
time series.
Business cycle theorists found that the stand-in household’s elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure must be large if the extended growth model is to display the business
cycle facts. I see overwhelming micro evidence that this elasticity is large, though many labor
economists disagree.
2 In this lecture, I will report additional evidence in support of a high value
for this substitution. The first category of evidence is the nonconstant growth behavior of the
Japanese economy in the 1970-2000 period. The second category of evidence is the differences
in market hours per working-age person associated with differences in the intratemporal tax
wedge.
Accounting for differences in output levels is closely related to, but differs from, the growth
accounting of Robert M. Solow (1957), who developed his accounting procedure before the de-
velopment of the general equilibrium growth model in which the consumption-investment deci-
sion and the labor-leisure decision are endogenous. My model has two central elements. The first
is the technology, which consists of an aggregate production function and the capital accumula-
tion equation. The aggregate production function is the stand-in for technology, and there is
some well-known aggregation theory behind it (Lionel W. McKenzie, 1981). The second is a
utility function for the stand-in household that depends on the path of consumption and leisure.
There is some not-so-well-known aggregation theory behind the stand-in household utility func-
tion.
3
The aggregate production function defines the maximum output that can be produced
given the quantities of the inputs. With competition, this maximum output is, in fact, the equilib-
rium output. Further, payments to the factors of production exhaust product. Thus, the aggregate9
production function, along with competitive equilibrium, provides a theory of the income side of
the national income and product accounts given the quantities of the factor inputs.
The near constancy of factor income shares across countries and time (Douglas Gollin,
forthcoming) leads to the Cobb-Douglas production function:
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Here  K  denotes the capital stock in period t ;  H , aggregate hours worked; C , aggregate con-
sumption; and  X , aggregate investment. The productivity or efficiency parameter  A is a coun-
try-specific productivity parameter that varies over time and is exogenous to the stand-in firm,
but is determined by policies. It measures the efficiency with which inputs are used in producing
output. The capital stock depreciates geometrically:
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Here  Nt  is the working-age population, cC N tt t = / , and hH N tt t = / .
Suppose that the working-age population grows at constant rates  NN t
t = 0η and that the
country-specific productivity parameter  it A  remains constant. Then this economy has a unique
constant-growth path in which all the quantities per working-age person grow by the factor γ ,
except market hours per working-age person h, which is constant. This fact motivates the ac-
counting that I adopt.
My level accounting rearranges terms in the production function and takes logarithms to de-
compose the determinants of output into trend and three factors. The advantage of this decompo-
sition is that each of the three factors leads to the examination of a different set of policies. Using10
lowercase letters to denote the per working-age person value of a variable and taking logarithms,
I write the production function as
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This representation provides a decomposition of the log of output into the following four factors:
1.  Trend growth  t γ .( 5 )
2.  Productivity factor  t A log . (6)
3.  Capital factor   ). / log( 1 t t y k θ
θ
− (7)
4.  Labor factor . log t h (8)
Along a constant growth path, output per working-age person grows at the trend rate and
each of the three other factors remains constant. Shifts in policy change the constant growth val-
ues of these factors and, therefore, change the intercept of the constant growth path as well.
Constraints imposed upon the way businesses operate, such as a requirement for extra staffing or
a restriction on the adoption of a more efficient production technology, will reduce the produc-
tivity factor. A change in the tax system that makes consumption more expensive in terms of lei-
sure will reduce the constant growth value of the labor factor. A change in the tax system that
taxes capital income at a higher level will reduce the constant growth value of the capital factor.
4
A. Convergence to the Constant Growth Path
An essential feature of the constant growth path is that, in the absence of a policy change,
the equilibrium converges to a constant growth path. Along a convergence path, the capital and
labor factors will not be zero. If the economy is below its constant growth path, the labor input
will be high and the capital factor low. Both of these factors converge to their constant growth11
values. As I will discuss, nonconstant growth behavior characterized the Japanese economy
throughout the last 40 years of the twentieth century.
In this lecture, I use a trend growth rate of 2 percent per year because this is the secular
growth rate of the U.S. economy in the twentieth century, γ =102 . . A motivation for using the
U.S. growth rate is that the United States is large, diverse, and politically stable, and it was the
industrial leader throughout the twentieth century. Perhaps in the twenty-first century, the Euro-
pean Union will become the industrial leader, and it will be appropriate to define the trend
growth rate relative to that economy rather than to the U.S. economy. Perhaps the trend growth
rate will increase; perhaps it will decrease. What will happen to trend growth γ is an interesting
question, but not the one addressed in this lecture.
B. Some Level Accounting
France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are currently depressed relative to the United
States by about 30 percent. The accounting for these depressions is in Table 2, where for each
factor the U.S. level has been normalized to 1. The table shows that most of the French depres-
sion is due to the depressed labor factor, while most of the Japanese depression is due to a de-
pressed productivity factor.12
Table 2







   France   -31%   6%   1%  -37%
   Japan   -31% -33%   3%    -1%
   United Kingdom  -41% -29%   2%  -13%
Source: GDP series are from OECD (2001). The series used was GDP at the prices and PPPs of
1995. The capital/output ratios are from OECD (1997) except Japan, which is from the Japanese
SNA. The capital/output ratios are for 1996, which is the latest available year. The labor input
was obtained by multiplying the “Average actual annual hours worked per person in employ-
ment” and “Total Employment” series obtained from the Labor Market Statistics of the OECD
Corporate Data Environment, which is available at http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde.
III. Introducing Taxes into the Model
Taxes affect the constant growth path of my model. I introduce three proportional taxes: a
consumption tax,  ct τ ; a labor income tax,  ht τ ; and a capital income tax,  kt τ . All receipts are dis-
tributed lump-sum back to the stand-in household. This is not to say that there is no public con-
sumption. Rather, I combine public consumption with private consumption. Implicitly, I am as-
suming that public schools are a good substitute for private schools, publicly provided police
protection a good substitute for privately provided security protection, publicly provided roads a
good substitute for tolls roads, and so on.
If some small fraction of GNP is allocated to pure public goods, the conclusions of this
analysis are unchanged. This assumption that not all public consumption is a good substitute for
private consumption would not be reasonable in a model economy with large military expendi-13
tures, as was the case for Germany in the 1936-45 period and the United States beginning in the
1942-45 wartime period.
Because I want to identify the role of consumption tax in the consumption-leisure deci-
sion, I use the price received by the producer for the value of the consumption good. National in-
come and product accounting uses the price paid by the household for the value of consumption
goods and services. The intertemporal budget constraint is
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Here the  t p  are the intertemporal prices faced by the household;  t r , the rental prices of capital;
t w , the wage rate; and  t T , the transfer payment.
A. The Intertemporal Tax Wedge
In fact, the tax system is more complicated than this, with property taxes, investment tax
credits, useful lives of capital equipment differing from book value lives, and so on. These fea-
tures of the tax system affect the capital factor, but the capital factor differs little across coun-
tries.
5 From the perspective of capital accumulation, tax systems in the major OECD countries
are roughly equivalent. For the tax system considered, the intertemporal tax wedge is
δ τ + − = ) 1 /( k t t i r . (10)
B. The Intratemporal Tax Wedge
Equating the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to their price

















where w is the wage rate and the tax rates are marginal rates. With convex tax schedules, the dif-
ferences between the marginal tax rate on labor income times labor income and labor income tax


























This relation is useful because constant growth  y c/  does not depend upon either  c τ or  h τ . I de-










This factor matters for labor supply in the following sense. The equilibrium is a function of the
product of α  and this tax wedge, and not of α ,  c τ , or  h τ  separately.
The assumption that the tax revenues are given back to households either as transfers or
as goods and services matters. If these revenues are used for some public good or are squan-
dered, private consumption will fall and the tax wedge will have little consequence for labor
supply.
6 If, as I assume, it is used to finance substitutes for private consumption, such as high-
ways, public schools, health care, parks, and police protection, then the  t t w c /  factor will not
change when the intratemporal tax factor changes. In this case, changes in this tax factor will
have large consequences for labor supply.
IV. The Capital Factor
The capital factor is not an important factor in accounting for differences in incomes
across the OECD countries. Table 3 reports the capital/output ratios for all OECD countries for
which data are available in the most recent OECD (1997) data set.
7 The capital stock is the tan-
gible private capital stock including the capital stock of quasi-corporations, which are govern-15
ment enterprises in the nomenclature of the U.S. national income and product accounts. The ratio
is between 2.2 and 2.7 with the smallest value being for France. The similarities of investment
shares of product and growth rates suggest that the number for France is higher than 2.2. Perhaps
different accounting conventions are followed in France with respect to the useful lives of differ-
ent types of capital. The low 2.3 number for the United States is reasonable given the lower U.S.














Source: Nominal capital stock numbers are from OECD (1997)
except Japan, which is from the Japanese SNA and is for 1998.
The series used is net stock of fixed capital. Government capital
is not included in this number.  Nominal GDP numbers are from
OECD (2001).16
Using a capital income share parameter of 0.3, which is the approximate capital share of
total product for all of the countries (Gollin, forthcoming), the capital factor contributes at most 8
percent to the differences in income between any of these countries.
Raphael Bergoeing et al. (2002) find that the Chilean and Mexican economies in the late
1980s are exceptions to the capital factor being unimportant in accounting for differences in in-
come levels. At that time, some changes led to a higher constant growth capital/output ratio. In
the case of Chile, Bergoeing et al. (2002) subsequently found that a cut in the corporate income
tax rate from 46 percent to 10 percent accounts for the change. In the case of Mexico, there was
no explicit change in the tax code. However, the banking system was nationalized at that time,
with most loans being made to state enterprises and firms that were effectively bankrupt, so there
could have been a change in the effective tax rate on capital income.
V. The Labor Factor
The labor factor is important in accounting for depressions. In some cases, a low labor
factor can be accounted for by a high marginal tax rate on labor income and consumption. In
other cases, as I will show, other policies that distort labor markets must be the cause of the low
labor input. The labor input might also be low because the economy’s capital stock is above its
constant growth path associated with its current policies. If the economy were near its constant
growth path and an unexpected change in policy lowered the constant growth path, the labor in-
put would fall below its new constant growth level and then converge up to this new level.
A. The Cause of the Current French Depression: Taxes
France is currently depressed by about 30 percent relative to the United States with the labor
factor accounting for nearly all of the depression. The capital factor and the productivity factor
are essentially equal in the two countries, whereas market time is about 30 percent lower in17
France than it is in the United States. Some suggest that the French can make more productive
use of their nonmarket time. But why did they work 10 percent more than the U.S. workers in
the 1970s? My analysis finds that French and U.S. preferences are similar and that the large dif-
ference in labor supply is the result of differences in policy that result in different intratemporal
tax wedges.
For France and the United Kingdom, I now determine how much of the difference in labor
supply is due to differences in the intertemporal tax wedge. I need an estimate of the consump-
tion tax rate  c τ  and the marginal tax rate on labor income  h τ  to calculate the intratemporal tax
wedge. These tax rates are estimated as follows.
8
My estimate of the consumption tax rate is the ratio of indirect taxes divided by private con-
sumption net of indirect taxes.
9 The motivation for this procedure is as follows. Most of indirect
taxes, including sales and value-added taxes, are consumption taxes. A property tax on an
owner-occupied house is equivalent to a consumption tax on the consumption services that the
house provides to the owner. The small part of indirect taxes on investment and public con-
sumption will be ignored. Given that the same procedure is used for each country, this will not
affect my conclusions.
The procedure for calculating the marginal tax rate on labor income is more complicated.
First I calculate the average social security tax rate on labor income by dividing social security
taxes by an estimate of labor income. The estimate of labor income is the labor share parameter
times output, where output is GDP less indirect taxes. The labor share parameter used is 0.70.
Next I calculate the average tax rate on factor income and assume that the average tax rate
on factor income is equal to the average tax rate on labor income. The estimated average tax
rates on labor income are direct taxes paid by households divided by GDP less the sum of indi-18
rect taxes and depreciation. Given the progressivity of the tax systems, these average tax rates
are multiplied by 1.6 to obtain estimates of marginal income tax rates on labor income not in-
cluding the social security tax.
A summary of the tax rates for France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are re-
ported in Table 4, which shows that the intratemporal tax wedge is large. In France, a worker
who works more and produces an additional unit of the consumption good gets to consume less
than 0.40 units of consumption. In the United States, the additional consumption is 0.60 units,
and in the United Kingdom, the additional consumption is 0.54 units.
Table 4
Current Intratemporal Tax Wedge for





c τ .33 .26 .13
h τ .49 .31 .32
    social security tax .33 .10 .12
    marginal income tax .15 .21 .20
Intratemporal tax wedge 2.58 1.82 1.46
Hours h .183 .235 .268
Predicted h .189 .250 .268
                Source: United Nations (2000).
These marginal tax rates are roughly what are obtained with a typical household. In the
United States in 1997, the average marginal federal income tax rate of working-age people was19
19.5 percent.
10 This number was computed as follows. The Internal Revenue Service reports the
number of single returns and the number of joint returns by marginal tax rates. I doubly
weighted the number of joint returns in the calculation of this average marginal tax rate because
most of these households had two working-age members. Some labor income is in the form of
untaxed fringe benefits, which lowers the 19.5 percent number. However, state and city income
taxes work in the opposite direction. These considerations led me to the conclusion that the 20
percent for the marginal tax rate is a reasonable number.
B. Major Findings
1.  France is depressed by 30 percent relative to the United States because the French labor
factor is 30 percent lower. The difference in the labor factors is due to differences in the
tax systems.
2.  The welfare gain in consumption equivalents of France reforming its tax system so that
its intertemporal tax wedge is the same as the U.S. tax wedge is 19 percent.
I find it remarkable that virtually all of the large difference in labor supply between France
and the United States is due to differences in tax systems. I expected institutional constraints on
the operation of labor markets and the nature of the unemployment benefit system to be more
important. I was surprised that the welfare gain from reducing the intratemporal tax wedge is so
large. Welfare gains associated with reforming tax systems are typically closer to 2 percent than
to 20 percent. Table 4 shows that the intratemporal tax wedge for the United Kingdom is be-
tween that of France and the United States, as is its labor factor.
Was the U.S. boom of the 1980s the result of lowering marginal tax rates on labor income in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act? The increase in the labor factor in that decade suggests that it might20
be. Was the large decline in the labor input in France in the 1929-38 period (Beaudry and Por-
tier, 2002) the result of an increase in the marginal tax rates on labor income?  These are inter-
esting questions.
C. Labor Market Distortions and the Interwar German, U.K., and U.S Depressions
Taxes are not the only reason that the labor factors differ. An example of this is the in-
terwar U.K. depression. As reported by Cole and Ohanian (2002, p. 42), this depression began in
1920 and continued into the late 1930s. They also report that between 1913 and 1929, real output
per adult fell by 1 percent in the United Kingdom while it rose by 30 percent in the rest of the
world. The labor factor accounts in large part for the United Kingdom being depressed in 1929
by about 30 percent relative to its trend-corrected pre-World War I level.
The Cole and Ohanian (2002) analysis finds that government social policies were un-
doubtedly the cause of the interwar period depression in the United Kingdom. There were high
levels of unemployment benefits and housing subsidies in conjunction with the need for labor to
move from the depressed northwest to southern England where the jobs were more plentiful.
Cole and Ohanian (2002) write in their conclusion, “Benefits were particularly attractive to
workers in export industries, because they faced high costs of leaving depressed regions due to
local housing subsidy policies.”
As shown by Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent (1998), some social policies that
work well in times when there is little need to reallocate labor work poorly when there is the
need for large reallocations as there was in the United Kingdom in the interwar period.
The interwar German depression is another dramatic example of labor market policies
giving rise to a depression. Fisher and Hornstein (2002) find a 10.9 percent increase in the trend-
corrected real wage associated with the 30 percent fall in output and employment. Once the real21
wage was again at trend, the German economy quickly recovered and returned to trend. Large
increases in public consumption did not lead to the German recovery; most of the recover oc-
curred before the increase in government expenditures.
Cole and Ohanian (1999) find that the U.S. economy did not recover in the 1935-39 pe-
riod from the Great Depression because the labor factor did not recover.  Cole and Ohanian
(2002) conclude that this failure was the result of New Deal policies that cartelized heavy indus-
tries.  Wages in this sector were high relative to other sectors and became even higher relative to
other sectors as the result of New Deal policies.  A consequence of this is that relative  employ-
ment in this sector declined.  Political support for this cartelization declined in 1939 as reflected
in the shift of the Roosevelt coalition.  Subsequent to this shift, the labor factor increased and the
U.S. economy returned to its 1929 trend.  The return to trend was prior to any large increase in
military expenditures.
VI. The Productivity Factor
The productivity factor is the most important factor in accounting for prosperity and de-
pressions. This is consistent with what development economists (Hall and Jones, 1999; Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997) have found, namely, that international income differences are in
large part accounted for by differences in total factor productivity, even after correcting for the
quality of the labor input.
11 It is consistent with the findings of real business cycle theorists that
in the postwar period, productivity shocks are the major contributor to business cycle fluctua-
tions.
The productivity factor is the major one in accounting for the Chilean depression that be-
gan in 1980, including the spectacular recovery (Bergoeing et al. 2002); in accounting for the
Mexican depression that began in 1982 and continues (Bergoeing et al. 2002); in accounting for22
the Argentine depression that began in the early 1970s (Finn E. Kydland and Carlos E. J. M.
Zarazaga, 2002); in accounting for the 1929-39 Canadian depression (Pedro S. Amaral and
James C. MacGee, 2002); and in accounting for the 35 percent trend-corrected decline in output
in the United States in the 1930-33 period (Ohanian, 2001). I now show that the productivity
factor is the major determinant of the behavior of the postwar Japanese economy.
A. Japan in the Postwar Period
The accounting for changes in output per working-age person is shown in Table 5. The
motivation for breaking up the time period this way is that within subperiods, productivity
growth is relatively constant, and between adjacent subperiods, productivity growth is very dif-
ferent. Given the behavior of the productivity factor, the nonconstant growth behavior of the
capital and labor factors conforms with the predictions of theory.
Table 5
Accounting for Japanese Growth per Person Aged 20-69
 Factors
Period Growth rate Trend
growth
Productivity Capital Labor
1960-1973 7.2% 2.0% 4.5% 2.3% -1.5%
1973-1983 2.2% 2.0% -1.2% 2.1% -0.7%
1983-1991 3.6% 2.0% 1.7% 0.2% -0.4%
1991-2000 0.5% 2.0% -1.7% 1.4% -1.3%
Source: Hayashi and Prescott (2002).23
The Japanese economy underwent remarkable changes in the 1960-2000 period. Figure 3
plots GDP per person aged 20-69 for Japan. As the figure shows, Japan experienced a growth
miracle in 1960-72, a period when its country-specific productivity factor increased by 71 per-
cent. Growth was slightly above trend in the 1973-83 period, with the positive capital contribu-
tion offset by the negative productivity contribution. The productivity factor again contributed
positively to growth in 1983-91, a period characterized by rapid but not spectacular growth.
Figure 3: Detrended Japanese GNP per Person Aged 20-69
The Japanese economy lost ground relative to trend in the 1991-2000 period. The prob-
lem was the country-specific productivity factor, which fell 17 percent in the 10-year period
from 1991 to 2000. The growth in GDP per person aged 20-69 was 7.2 percent a year in 1960-
72, which is miraculous. In the 1960s, Japanese living standards doubled, which requires 35
years for a country growing at the trend rate. As theory predicts, there was capital deepening and
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constant growth path. In 1973-83, productivity growth plunged. The growth in this period was
mainly due to an increase in the capital factor.
B. How Does the Theory Do in the Earlier Period?
An estimate for each parameter can be obtained using only the observations for a single
year and the consumption for the subsequent year. If the parameter estimates stay relatively con-
stant over time and display no trend, the predicted path of the economy will be close to the actual
path. In making these predictions, productivity, population, and the tax variables are taken as ex-
ogenous. For the Japanese economy, these parameters are nearly constant from 1970 to 2000, as
can be seen in Table 6.
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Table 6
Average Parameter Estimates for Japan
period δ θ β α
1960-69 0.131 0.385 0.933 1.781
1970-79 0.101 0.351 0.971 2.321
1980-89 0.094 0.354 0.971 2.277
1990-99 0.096 0.363 0.967 2.424
Parameter constancy, however, does not hold for the 1960s. In the 1960s, the value of  β
was lower than it was after 1970, and, more important, the disutility of work as measured by α
increased steadily over the decade. Perhaps, for the extremely long workweeks of the 1960s,
there were decreasing returns to longer workweeks. If so, a better modeling of the employment-
hours decision is needed.
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Given the importance of the productivity factor, the mapping between policies and the
productivity factor is important for understanding how to create prosperity. I will discuss three
policies that empirically appear to affect productivity.
C. Trading Clubs and Productivity
The first is the policy of setting up what I will call a trading club. As seen in Table 1, five
Western European countries had a large increase in their country-specific productivity factor be-
ginning in the late 1950s and continuing into the 1990s. These countries—Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and Netherlands—are prosperous relative to their trend-corrected levels in the
1913-38 period. What policy change accounts for this prosperity? What these countries have in
common is that, along with Luxembourg, they are the original European Union countries that
signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This fact, along with some theoretical reasoning, suggests
that establishing this trading arrangement was crucial to the dramatic growth in productivity.
I define a trading club as a set of states with a considerable degree of sovereignty. The
states agree not to subsidize their producers who either export goods or produce goods that com-
pete with foreign imports. With such a policy game, inefficient industries that seek the protection
of their state cannot be granted this protection without violating the club’s agreement. Export in-
dustries face elastic demand, and jobs are gained, not lost, when production efficiency is in-
creased. In these cases, there is no opposition to more efficient production. In addition, a trading
club arrangement is sustainable, because efficient exporters will oppose violating the rules gov-
erning trade when inefficient producers seek protection.
Formal membership of neighboring states is not necessary for a country to be de facto
subject to the rules of the club. This may account for the growth in trend-corrected productivity
in states neighboring the original European Union members. In some cases, the productivity26
growth occurred well before the state joined this union. In other cases, such as Greece, Ireland,
and Portugal, much of the growth in country-specific productivity occurred after the state joined
the European Union.
The European Union is not the only important and successful trading club. After the U.S.
civil war (Maddison, 2001, Table E7, p. 351), GDP per hour was 13 percent higher in the United
Kingdom than in the United States. By 1913, the United States was 16 percent more productive,
and by 1929, the United States 30 percent more productive. In the 1870-1929 period, the United
States was a trading club with free movement of goods and people between states. Perhaps this is
why the United States not only caught up to the United Kingdom in terms of productivity in this
period, but surged far ahead of it.
D. Financial Systems and Productivity
Another policy associated with poor productivity performance is centralized allocation of
savings to investments. As shown by Bergoeing et al. (2002), Chile and Mexico had financial
crises and large declines in output in the early 1980s. Chile reformed its financial system and
adopted a sound market mechanism to allocate savings to investment. Chile’s productivity and
output quickly recovered. Mexico did not reform its financial system, and productivity and out-
put did not recover. Mexico is still depressed by 30 percent relative to its level in 1982, the year
its depression began.
The candidate mechanism by which centralized financial systems adversely affect pro-
ductivity is as follows. Inefficient producers are subsidized in order to preserve jobs. This has the
perverse effect of lowering productivity and decreasing overall employment in the economy. Ja-
pan is another depressed country with a highly centralized financial system controlled by the27
state. Perhaps this accounts for the 17 percent decline in its productivity factor in the 1991-2000
period.
E. Competition and Productivity
Production organizations are complex entities with behavior that is the outcome of a
complicated dynamic game. There is no guarantee that the equilibrium outcome of such a game
will be characterized by efficient production. Martin Neil Baily and Solow (2001) report from
productivity studies using firm-based studies that when faced with international competition, in-
dustry productivity increases to best practice levels. Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez and James A.
Schmitz, Jr. (forthcoming) find that North American iron mines doubled their productivity in the
early 1980s by simply changing work practices. This change occurred because of excess capacity
in the industry at that time. Mines had to either increase productivity or be shut down.
Thomas J. Holmes and Schmitz (2001) present strong evidence that competition from
railroads led to increases in the efficiency of water transportation in the U.S. post-Civil War pe-
riod. If they are correct and productivity depends upon the nature of the competitive environ-
ment, railroads were important in U.S. economic development in the 1870-90 period when the
dominant means of transportation shifted from the waterways to the railways. Similarly, the in-
terstate highway system was important in U.S. economic development in the 1960-90 period
when the dominant means of transportation shifted from railways to highways.
VII. Conclusions
Depressions are not a thing of the past, even for rich industrial countries. Switzerland is cur-
rently depressed 30 percent relative to its trend-corrected 1970 level, and Japan is currently de-
pressed 20 percent relative to its 1991 level and continues to become more depressed. On the
prosperity side, Ireland is 60 percent more prosperous than in 1970, correcting for trend growth.28
Growth theory is a powerful tool for studying depression and prosperity. French, Japanese,
and U.S. workers all have similar preferences. The French are not better at enjoying leisure. The
Japanese are not compulsive savers. In this lecture, I use this theory to develop a system of ac-
counting for differences in output per working-age person. One factor is the exogenous level of
technology. It is common across countries and grows smoothly over time. Another factor is the
capital factor, which depends upon how capital is taxed and the nature of capital market distor-
tions. This factor turned out not to be very important in accounting for differences across coun-
tries and time.
The labor factor, however, turned out to be important. The differences in the consumption
and labor tax rates in France and the United States account for virtually all of the 30 percent dif-
ference in the labor input per working-age person. The welfare gains associated with France re-
ducing its intratemporal tax wedge are large. Is the low labor supply in Germany, Italy, and
Spain also due to a tax system that makes consumption expensive in terms of leisure? Other la-
bor policies also have large macro effects as evidenced by the Great U.K. Depression that began
in 1920 and continued for nearly 20 years and the interwar German depression.
The final factor, productivity, is the most important one. It accounts for the behavior of the
Japanese economy in 1960-2000, a period during which both a growth miracle and a depression
occurred. It accounts for much of the current differences in income across the OECD countries
today and changes in relative incomes of these countries over time. In this lecture I discuss three
polices that empirically appear to affect the productivity factor. Trading clubs, sound competitive
mechanism for the allocation of saving to investment, and competitive arrangements all appear to
foster production efficiency.  More industry studies with careful micro measurement, along with29
better theory, hopefully, will provide a better understanding of how policy determines productiv-
ity and this understanding will lead to better policy.30
Notes
1In 1934, Carl Warburton published a table that contained gross national product for the
United States with a breakdown between consumption and investment (Ruggles,1983, p. 17).
2The findings are consistent with those of James J. Heckman and Thomas E. McCurdy
(1980) when they estimate labor supply for females taking into consideration the employment
rate margin.
3See Richard Rogerson (1988), Gary D. Hansen (1985), and Andreas Hornstein and
Prescott (1993).
4Peter J. Klenow and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1997) use this capital factor in their ac-
counting for international income differences.
5For a detailed examination for the United States in the postwar period, see Ellen R.
McGrattan and Prescott (2001). All of the factors that arise from the Dale Jorgenson and Robert
E. Hall (1969) rental price of capital are incorporated in that analysis.
6See McGrattan and Ohanian (1999) and Jonas D. M. Fisher and Hornstein (2002). They
find that public expenditures for military purposes are largely offset by reductions in private con-
sumption, as theory predicts.
7Capital stock data for Canada are available, but that country clearly used a different con-
cept of capital when reporting to the OECD, because the number reported is near 1 GNP. The
Japanese capital stock figure is obtained from the Japanese SNA and is for 1998. Not until 1998
did the Japanese capital/output ratio approach its constant growth value.31
8The source of the data used for the calculations of the tax rates is the United Nations
(2000). These tax rates are the average for 1993-95, which are the latest years for which the
needed data are available.
9See McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) for more on taxes.
10I used the U.S. IRS (1999) Individual Income Returns 1997, Table 3.6, to obtain these
fractions.
11Not all accept these findings. In particular Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (2002) concludes that
country-specific productivity factors are second-order in understanding large international in-
come differences, as do Larry E. Jones and Rodolfo E. Manuelli (1997).
12The capital share parameter in the production function is greater than the typical 0.30
number for other countries because of the high value of land in Japan relative to GNP.
13Hayashi and Prescott (2002) found that the workweek in the late 1980s was longer than
what the Japanese people wanted. The labor input fell when it was reduced from 44 to 40 hours a
week to be consistent with people’s preferences in the 1989-92 period. Their representation of
preferences is a local approximation.32
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